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Every great people believes, and must
believe if it intends to live long, that
in it alone resides the salvation of the
world; that it lives in order to stand
at the head of nations,
...to lead them in a concordant choir
toward the final goal preordained for
them.
Feodor Dostoyevsky
The Soviet Union is a riddle, wrapped in
mystery, inside an enigma.
Sir Winston Churchill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
After the Second World War, when the Soviet Union
surprised many people by embarking on a very aggressive
policy and forced communism on several of the East and
Central European countries, interest in studying the Soviet
Union and its foreign policies exploded. Even though the
country had a potential for being one of the most powerful
countries in the world, not much was known about it.
Early post-war studies concentrated on Soviet strategic
potential, and this, combined with the knowledge of marxist-
leninist ideology and its goals, caused immense fear in the
West. With little knowledge about the Soviet Union and its
Russian heritage, this was quite a natural reaction at this
time. Much later, research was conducted on a "deeper"
basis, analyzing Russian history and culture and its
possible impact on the Soviet Union, its leaders, and their
goals. It was became obvious, at least among some
researchers, that the communist revolution of 1917 could not
be seen as year zero in the Soviet Union. A certain degree
of continuity from the Russian heritage, must still be
there. Debate then arose over what was dominating:
traditional Russian expansionism and security occupation, or
communist/ leninist ideology and "export of revolution".
Rereading analyses of Soviet politics and foreign
policy from the early and even mid 1980's, one is easily
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struck by the negative conclusions drawn from these studies.
The recent drastic and quick changes in Eastern Europe and
the Gorbachev regime's advocacy of "New Thinking" have
caused a great surprise in the West. Naturally, each
analysis has to be viewed from its specific time frame but
there are certain aspects that have contributed to an often
overly negative Western picture of the Soviet Union. First,
the aggressive Soviet preoccupation with security has been
seen in the West as highly offensive. Second, an
ideological framework within a changeless totalitarianism,
has been seen as giving the Soviet leaders a "mission", a
cause for world wide expansion, either from a leninist
perspective or through roots of historic Russian
nationalism. These aspects combined with the Western way of
producing highly rational-based analyses of the Soviet
Union, have given an impression of a Soviet master-plan in a
quest of increased power and domination. Cases of pragmatism
have therefore tended to be neglected.
The Cold War era can be viewed as a time period of
continous mutual misperception by both sides in the bipolar
system. A major factor causing these misperceptions is the
lack of understanding the opposite partner's belief system.
As Seweryn Bialer argues, the belief system (as one of
several groups of factors affecting Soviet foreign policy)
is, if not the least known, then the least understood
element in the West. A better understanding would provide
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clues for reacting to particular Soviet actions and decrease
tensions. [1] This is not an easy task; as Paul Dibb states:
"Seeing what the world looks like from Moscow is, in the
first instance, to try to understand the complexity of the
Russian mind, colored as it is by the experience of history,
the facts of geography, and the Kremlin overlay of ideology!
The view that the leadership in the Kremlin has of the
outside world needs to be seen in the context of these
experiences, both direct and inherited"
.
[2
]
The present political transformation in Eastern Europe,
though a most welcome change, is dangerous - at least for
the East European countries and the Soviet Union - but full
of opportunities for a better world. Considering the
insecure position of the Soviet empire and the present
reform-minded Soviet regime, and the highly sensitive and
traditional Soviet/Russian security and nationalist
perceptions, the responsibility of the new Eastern European
regimes as well as the West is great. New serious
misperceptions must be avoided. In order to avoid future
misperceptions it is essential to understand more about the
Russian political culture and heritage. Due to necessary
changes in the Soviet political system, interactions between
the West and the Soviet regime are likely to increase
drastically and therefore also the risks of further
misunderstandings
.
This study analyzes traditional Russian nationalism and
security, its heritage and impact on Soviet political
culture and relations with other nations, particularly
Eastern Europe. A thorough analysis and understanding of the
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Russian political roots and its difference from the Western
political heritage is of major importance for the new,
fragile East-West relations. Russian nationalism and
security are important parts in the Soviet political
thinking and must therefore be analyzed.
In order to better understand Soviet relations, and
possible intentions, a case study is carried out, reviewing
the Soviet-Finnish relationship. In the fast moving
political changes of Eastern Europe, the experience of the
Soviet-Finnish relations are seen in this study as important
to consider in order to achieve a future stability in the
region. The case study will take a closer look at a unique
and often neglected or mistreated relationship between the
Soviet Union and a pluralistic society, with a Western
market-oriented system, and within a Soviet sphere of
influence. This particular case is marked with several
extraordinary circumstances, specific for this case, such as
history, culture/social relations, and geopolitical matters.
In spite of these specific characteristics the case does
illustrate a functioning relationship between a Soviet
social/political system and a Western pluralistic system.
The familiar term "Finlandization" has been avoided. The
reasons for this are that the value-loaded term has often
been misused in efforts to demonstrate examples for all
different kinds of purposes. Efforts are made to divide the
facts that are specific for Finland itself and what can be
learned from the Finnish experience of building a democratic
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society in the shadow of the Soviet Union. The case study
will reveal certain general aspects concerning security and
mutual confidence that can serve as guidelines even for a
region so different and more complex as Eastern Europe.
The specific questions which this study wants to
investigate are the following:
1) How have the Soviet-East European relations been shaped?
What constitute security and mutual confidence in this
relationship? What other possible variables such as Soviet
prestige, economic reasons, or ideology influences or even
endangers the continuing political transformation of Eastern
Europe?
2) How can the Eastern European countries move towards more
pluralistic societies while keeping the risk of Soviet
intervention to a minimum?
3) What Western positions and measures would be the most
appropriate to facilitate a continued political
transformation of Eastern Europe?
To be able to give clear answers to these questions it
is necessary to approach the problem on a broader basis. The
Soviet-Russian background or heritage must be analyzed in
order to understand political culture, social patterns, and
thinking. These aspects will form the ground for the
discussion of the specific questions above. A better
understanding of Soviet-Russian political culture is likely
to reduce the risks of misperceptions and thereby help to
the creation of stability in Eastern Europe.
5
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
This study emphasizes cultural and historical
influences. The objects of research are not actors, but
collective minds with a specific mentality. Individuals,
with their statements and actions, are viewed as
representatives of their culture. Therefore, manners,
rituals, and symbolic behavior in general are regarded as
important objects in the analysis. What is sought is the
typical and not the unique. The reason for this emphasis is
the effort of the study to point out important differences
in thinking between the Soviet Union/Russia and Europe, and
hence possible explanations for Soviet-West
misunderstanding. The results of the analysis are intended
to give guidelines of what important measures should be
taken, in both East and West Europe, to produce a Soviet
perception that the conditions to their security can be
satisfied. As implied in this argumentation, the researcher
assumes that a cultural context forms the foundation of
thinking which then, through many different processes,
produces political results such as security and foreign
policies. One could interpret this as, first, a view of
continuity from thinking to action, and, second, as a
process that is, basically, little changed from one
generation to the other because of a cultural and historical
heritage. Certainly, there are great many other variables,
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which also change over time and affect outcomes such as
security and foreign policies. James Rosenau, discussing the
preoccupation with drawing conclusions from cultural and
historical contexts in Soviet studies, argues:
"Undoubtedly the continuities of Soviet life are more
powerful than the impulses to innovate and change, but it
violates everything we know about social systems to presume
that they can adhere to a never-ending constancy in foreign
affairs, that goals and priorities are not altered across
generations, and that the emergence of new technologies,
institutions, and social structures have no consequences for
the values that underlie policy making. [1]
It has been argued by many students of foreign policy that
the importance of traditional political culture is
diminishing .[ 2 ] This, it is argued, stems from increasing
education and communicative influences in the world. Others
have argued that the inherited culture and therefore
continuity in thinking has generally been underestimated by
social scientists and that the strength of this inheritance
is much stronger than previously thought. [3]
This study is based on a political culture approach.
The approach is one which includes great many variables and
can be defined as:
"The subjective perception of history and politics, the
fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification
and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations
which are the product of the specific historical experience
of nations and groups. [4]
David Paul argues that a study, based on the concept of
political culture:
"..must proceed from a broadly based familiarity with the
history, politics, sociology, economics, and intellectual
7
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° f society - just as anthropological studiesof specific cultures must proceed from a similarfamiliarity"
.
[ 5]
The study of political culture and its heritage can be
seen as one group of factors within the sort of domestic
approach advocated by Seweryn Bialer.[6] This view argues
that the domestic context can be summarized as capabilities,
politics, and beliefs. Capabilities includes such factors as
economic, technological, and military strength. Politics is
concerned with the institutions and process of Soviet
foreign policy making, nature and guality of information
used in these processes and units, power and personality of
the key actors, identification of major pressure groups and
their access, interests, and influence in policy making, and
divisions within the leadership and elites regarding
different policy lines and issues etc. [7] Bialer argues that
the third group of factors, beliefs, deals with the
following aspects:
"..the basic outlook on international affairs of Soviet
decision makers, with the basic beliefs that they share in
common and that were shaped by their common tradition,
experience, and value system, with the basic assumptions
about themselves and other international actors with which
they approach their activities in the international arena,
with the process of learning by which these assumptions are
slowly adjusted, with their capital concerns about foreign
relations, and with their fears and hopes" .[8]
This belief system, an abstract group of factors, and the
point of concentration in this study, includes all those
experiences and traditions of history, politics, sociology,
economics, and intellectual patterns which David Paul argued
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were necessary to be able to understand a society's
political culture.
According to Alexander Dallin, the domestic approach
should be seen, in part, as a reaction against earlier
realist stress on the international system and, also,
against a long time prevailing view that foreign policy
could be conducted essentially in insulation from domestic
pressures and politics which had no impact on the outcomes
of international interaction
.[ 9 ] Instead, as Dallin argues,
there is a substantial and significant interrelationship
between external and internal aspects of foreign policy. In
his view:
"While the nature of this relationship and its
manifestations have undergone considerable changes over
time, the linkage is real and important though often
imperfectly perceived or understood
.[ 10
]
In our efforts to analyze foreign policy within the
context of a different culture, we have to understand that
we are doing this from our own perspective, within a
cultural framework of thinking not fully known to us.
A hermeneutic approach, as used in this study, acknowledges
the researcher's own influence over the interpretation of
data. The researcher's own pre-understanding of the subject,
even the choice of subject and methodology will have its
impact on the study. As Richard Palmer says:
"Explanation will certainly rely on the tools of the
objective analysis, but the explanation of the relevant
tools is already an interpretation of the task of
understanding". [11]
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The hermeneutic view acknowledges that one and the same
incident, or course of events, can be interpreted in many
different ways. There is no exact "truth" or "logic
structure" in real events. Therefore different viewers give
their attentions unevenly to certain incidents or facts. It
follows from this that contexts will be presented
differently when our impressions are made from variable
perspectives. These perspectives, or paradigms, are not only
different between different researchers, but can also shift
within the researchers themselves while they are working
with the interpretation of historical events. This assumes
that the researcher is part of the work and its influences,
and can not claim an "objective" position to the facts that
are interpreted. Therefore, in a hermeneutic approach
researchers/analysts should not - because they can not - try
to rid themselves of pre-understanding and subjectivity.
Instead this pre-understanding should be seen as a vital
contribution to the study. The reasons for this view are
that the concept of truth is regarded as pragmatic as the
aim is not to find the essence of certain aspects, claiming
"perfect" truth, but to have actions and events making
sense. [ 12
]
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CHAPTER 3
RUSSIA/ NATIONALISM, AND SECURITY - THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS HERITAGE
3.1 The Contrary Pulls of Asian and European
Influence
Russia's split geographic position on the borderland
between Europe and Asia, is reflected profoundly in its
people's mentality. Though having a long history of contact
with the European states, the Russians were for over 250
years part of the Mongolian empire. During this era little
contact was upheld with Europe and the result was a long
period of Russian isolation from the mainstream of European
culture and civilization. Even though the Russians share the
same religous heritage as the European countries and have
Slavic "brethren" far to the west in continental Europe,
Paul Dibb argues that:
"What we need to understand is that Russia is a country
profoundly dissimilar from any Western state in its customs,
institutions, traditions, habits, and attitudes" .[ 1]
The Tatars of the Mongolian empire established control
in the Russian heartland by appointing Russian princes who
were entirely subordinate in a puppet-form manner. When the
Tatar controlled empire began to disintegrate at the end of
the 15th century the power shifted to Moscow and the
Russians thereby came under Muscovite rule. The fascinating
fact was, according to
Ronald Hingley, that the framework of control was simply
passed on from the Tatars to the Muscovites without any
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change. Change was not necessary and wanted in order for the
Muscovites to keep control of the former Tatar empire
subjects. [2
]
It is possible to argue that this long Asian influence
in state authority has created a political base which
diverged Russia's development from the Western evolution of
state authority. While authoritarian rule has, though
unevenly and with periods of reversals, steadily declined in
the West over the centuries a markedly contrary trend is to
be observed in Russia from the fifteenth century and
onward. [3] Communist rule introduced by Lenin and
consolidated under Stalin did nothing' to reverse this trend.
On the contrary it even increased the amount of
authoritarian rule.
Even though Muscovy threw off the Tatar rule over
Russia in about 1480 and counterattacked in the following
century, the Mongol influence prevailed for centuries.
Harassment by slave-trapping Tatars and freebooters
continued and not until the late 18th century, with the
conquest of the Crimea, was this everpresent ordeal ended.
Ronald Hingley estimates that this Tatar scourge of Russia
prevailed from roughly 1240 to roughly 1783 — more than half
a millennium. [ 4 ] Russia was more or less isolated from
Europe between the 12th century to the 15th century. After
this period, contact with Europe increased rapidly but the
cultural isolation of the majority of the Russian subjects
prevailed. Russia had not developed a culture capable of
12
assimilating European cultural streams such as the
Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Russia remained
col lectivistic and centralized. Opposition groups never
aroused and the power relation of church, state, and Tsar
was never questioned.
The long period of contact with the Mongols in
political, social, and cultural forms, created an outlook of
Russian society as being more Eastern than Western. Paul
Dibb argues:
"Certainly the succession of despotic rulers, both Czarist
and Communist, and the tendency of the Russian people to
look up to authoritarian leadership, is more Eastern than
Western in its tradition. So is the obedience to authority,
the toleration of secrecy, the fetish with rank, the control
over the persons, the property and even the thoughts of its
citizens, the state ownership of all land, and the system of
universal service and unqualified submission to the
state"
.
[ 5
]
A more Western-like rationality has been mixed and
blurred with the more Asian ultimate respect for authority
and slavish obedience to the sovereigns. A suitable example
is the story about Tsar Nicholas I who decided to build the
first major railway in Russia, linking St . Petersburg and
Moscow. The Tsar settled the route by seizing a ruler and
drawing a line between the two cities on a map. The
engineers faithfully followed the line, down to minor
detours accidentally caused at points where the Tsar's
fingers were in the way of the pen. [6] Whether this story is
a true one or not it illustrates the Russian peculiarity of
strict obedience to higher authority.
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As mentioned earlier, Russia by being located on the
borderline between Europe and Asia, inhabited by people with
physical similarity to the Europeans but with a great Asian
influence in traditions and thinking, has created a feeling
of uncertainty among the Russians about their country's
proper identity in the world. From the 16th century onwards
the Russian emperors seeked to be accepted and integrated in
European affairs but was mostly neglected and considered as
a non-European, "Asiatic-type" nation. [7] This neglect and
even contempt for Russia among its socially more advanced
Western neighbors created an inferiority complex. [8] Russia,
in its search for a European identity, felt its own
backwardness when compared to the nations of the West in
almost all areas - culturally, economically, industrially,
and administratively. Russia abolished serfdom not until
1861 and the hereditary autocracy was not abolished until
1917. On all fronts Russia was way behind the European
states. Ronald Hingley argues that these feelings of
inferiority caused a kind of love-hate hysteria towards
Europe and other typical manifestations such as "extreme
national boastfulness combined with extreme self-
deprecation" [ 9 ] This inferiority complex was met by
aggressive policies based mostly in sheer size, i.e. large
standing armies constantly prepared for attacks.
Russia's connection to Europe has, through history,
been ambivalent. While the nation, with its certain
14
characteristics
,
could not fully identify itself as a
European state, it was simultaneously a defender of
Christianity in the East, executing a self-appointed mission
of pushing back Islam, i.e. Turkey, from the European
continent.
Panslavism was another root of Russian orientation
towards Europe. The Tsars committed the Russians to the
defense of, especially, the unstable Slavic Balkan
countries, bringing Russia to wars with Turkey, and against
the Continental Powers in the First World War.
The major westernization of Russia was done through
Catherine the Great and Peter the Great, with the latter
adopting an almost enforced westernization, demonstrated by
the elite and the new-built Russian capital, St. Petersburg.
According to Jerry Hough, this was an alien development to
most Russians .[ 10 ] Part of the Russian royalty, and much of
the country's elite, had a heritage and other connections to
Europe untypical for the rest of the empire. During historic
Russia's most intimate relationship with Europe, after the
Napoleonic Wars, most of Russia's diplomats and other elites
representing the country were, in fact, not ethnic
Russians. [ 11]
3.2 Russian Expansionism
While the Russians were struggling to throw off the
Mongol yoke from the East they were, simultaneously,
repeatedly attacked from the West by the Polish, Swedish,
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Lithuanian, Turkish, and later, French and German forces.
Especially the more recent German invasions - two within a
of thirty years and the last causing an enormous
death toll - constitute a special chapter in Russian/Soviet
perception of security. The "Great Patriotic War" is still
remembered like "yesterday"
.[ 12
]
These successive waves of invasion created what Paul
Dibb calls a "persecution complex"
.[ 13 ] This can be
described as almost a paranoic fear based on being a lonely
country in a hostile world and in a constant need to look
for security. Russia, consisting largely of a vast plain
with no significant natural barriers between its Western
frontiers and the far-distant mountain ranges of central
Siberia, lacked natural defensive borders. Russia's
geographical situation and the lessons learned from
invasions made the Russians especially aware of geographic
issues. Ronald Hingley argues that "sheer territorial size
has been a dominant factor conditioning the Russian
mentality for many centuries" [ 14 ] It became important to the
Russians to create buffer zones in all directions.
Expansionism became a natural policy from this strategic
thinking. Kristian Gerner argues "the gathering of Russian
lands is seen as the natural thing to do for every Russian
ruler and this includes not only clearly ethnic Russian
territories"
.
[ 15]
Another reason for expansionism is the Russians'
belief that it is vital to reach usable water-ways- to open
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oceans. Many of the water areas they have reached are
confined by narrow straits. (The most cited ones are the
Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, the Black Sea and the
Dardanelles Straits, and later, the Arctic Sea towards the
Atlantic)
. The Russian desire to reach warm, open oceans has
continued to be a reason for expansionism through history.
Whatever territory acquired, be it the Eastern shore of
the Baltic Sea or Ukraina, is seen as a reunion with the
fatherland. [ 16 ] There has been a striking righteousness
among the Russian leaders about the conquering and
incorporation of territories over history. Jaroslav Pelenski
argues that a Russian imperial ideology and cultural world
view came into being through the conquering of the first
non-Great Russian ethnic territory - Kazan in 1552. [17]
According to Jaroslav Pelenski, the Kazan population was
divided into good and evil people. Those who were good asked
the Muscovites to establish order while the bad were the
rebellious tyrants causing the anarchy. Upon request from
the good people the Muscovites intervened. After the Russian
conquest a "Kazanskaya Istoriya", a historical
justification, was written. In Jaroslav Pelenski 's view this
work serves as a valuable early source for the understanding
of Russian political thought. According to the "Kazanskaya
Istoriya" the peace established by the Muscovites was the
ideal condition for the Kazan population who had achieved
security and protection. Orthodox Christianity was replacing
alien beliefs and true faith was established. Jaroslav
17
argues that the work also advocated imperial growth
and territorial expansion. [ 18 ] The work or document was to
become a base for the Muscovites right to decide what was
good for the neighboring people. So-called alienated
territories were to be brought back to the "Fatherland" and
the territorial growth of the Russian empire was the meaning
of history.
Kristian Gerner, refering to Jaroslav Pelenski's work,
argues
:
"Through the reading of the 'Kazanskaya Istoriya' it was
natural for any literate Russian to regard conquest of
ethnically different but adjacent territories as an act of
liberation, greeted by the true elements among the liberated
people"
.
[ 19
]
The message given by "Kazanskaya Istoriya" certainly seems
to be similar to phrases or interpretations done in more
modern times, but it is questionable whether one can go as
far as Kristian Gerner does by comparing the document
directly with the "Brezhnev Doctrine" promulgated after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The "Brezhnev Doctrine"
justified the action for "the defense of socialism" and to
stop the "rebels", all based on a "request from the
Czechoslovak brothers"
.
[20]
Kristian Gerner also argues that the imperial ideology
was repeated once again with the Soviet military "help" to
Afghanistan in late 1979. In any case, there are peculiar
similarities between "Kazanskaya Istoriya" and recent Soviet
statements in connection with invasions. It is easier though
to agree with Kristian Gerner 's argumentation that the
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"Kazan document", and its incorporation into Russian
traditions, explains the ease with which the Russians
greeted the actions of 1968 and 1979. [21]
Naturally, the vast Russian expansionism and the
willingness to hold on to most of the land that was
conquered has created a difficult situation and a great
challenge for the empire. All along the enlarged borders
there are ethnic groups "spilled" across the borders. A
Russian majority populates the greater part of the Russian
plain and Siberia, but they are flanked in all directions by
non-Russian people. According to Paul Dibb this has led to a
natural outgrowth of Russian foreign policy:
"The traditional aim of Russian foreign policy has been to
overcome this drawback by absorbing or truncating weak
neighbors and to exercize as much control as possible over
those unwilling to yield and able to resist". [22]
Russian experience of contacts with foreign people or
nations have been a history of clashes and conflict. Paul
Dibb argues that a "..state of almost continous aggressive
and defensive wars gave to Russian society its distinctive
form". [23] When Russia after the successful revolution of
1917 became the Soviet Union, it was the first communist
country in the world. The former Russian empire, now
officially "The Soviet of the People's Commissars" could not
have chosen a worse position for its political security. The
old, conservative European countries were highly suspicious
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about the new Russian state and frightened of a possible
spread of communism to their own states. Several of the
European countries intervened in the Russian civil war that
followed the revolution. Later they established the so
called "Cordon Sanitare" in Eastern Europe which was
regarded as highly offensive by the Soviets. The traditional
Russian security paranoia had all the reasons to remain firm
and the Soviet notion of "Capitalist Encirclement" was
established as a national fear. The capitalist world was
seen as conspiring against socialism.
3.3 Russian Nationalism and Soviet Communism
The new Soviet state brought a repression of the
opposition even worse when than that of the period of the
19th century known as the severest of political oppression
in Russia - the last part of the reign of Nicholas I (1848-
55) . The Bolsheviks, well aware from their own experience of
infiltration channels and corruption as methods for
overthrowing the state, were on alert at once. [24] The
pluralist political sub-culture which had emerged at the
turn of the century was immediately supressed and later,
with Stalin's consolidation of power, virtually wiped out.
The Soviet state brought a merger of political and
ideological power. Certainly, this was an efficient method
to acquire ultimate control over the new Soviet subjects but
it is interesting to note that the Soviet political heritage
20
and the Russian notion of authority facilitated this
increase in political domination.
The new dogmatic ideology, officially Marxist, came to
be transformed and "colored" by traditional Russian culture
in many different ways. What seems to be strange and
confusing to foreigners observing Soviet Marxism can be
claimed to be essentially Russian cultural peculiarities.
Kristian Gerner argues that "..the pictures of the Soviet
leaders carried in the processions on 1 May and 7 November
every year should not be interpreted as portraits but as
representations of the power which they embody - that of the
communist party". [25] Kristian Gerner refers to the
traditional Russian icon which is not a portrait but a
representation, a reminder that the one who is "..faithful
is assured that heaven is with him and waits for him". [26]
This is the traditional Russian emphasis on the content of
the picture or portrait rather than the picture itself.
Therefore, the picture must not necessarily correspond to
reality. The retouching of pictures or portraits, and
distortions of history are as natural to the Russians as it
is strange to the Europeans. Kristian Gerner cites another
example that seems so awkward to many Westerners - the
ritualized participation by the audience in speeches made by
the Soviet leaders with applause, standing ovations, and
genuflexes. This is, according to Kristian Gerner, a
continuation of the Russian tradition in the singing and the
rituals of the Russian Orthodox mass.
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Perhaps the most important factor influencing or even
shaping the official Soviet ideology is traditional Russian
nationalism. It is a nationalism that is defensive in
nature, a nationalism that stresses a separate way for
Russia from other nations and the traditional "we-they"
syndrome in international relations
.[ 27 ] Jerry Hough has
argued that a key reason why Lenin won wide support was the
anti-Western implications of his program, his determination
that Russian industrialization should be built under
institutions very different from those in Western Europe,
and the overthrow of the Westernized elite that was ruling
Russia. [28] Seweryn Bialer argues that the Soviet state has
yet an undiminished imperial nationalism - probably the last
one on the globe. [29] Adam Ulam, refering to the strong
Russian nationalism as an off-spring from its inferiority
complex vis-a-vis Europe, argues that while imperialism
became unfashionable in Europe it is still providing the
psychological underpinning in Soviet ideology.
Marxism merged with Russian nationalism and the
synthesis became Soviet communism, internationalist in form
and nationalist in essence. [30] The new, young Soviet state
provided a perfect framework for a Russian imperialism and a
international mission that was present long before the
revolution. The new Soviet state brought to the old
nationalism the energy of a young, growing, ambitious, and
assertive nationalism with an aggressive edge. It is
possible to argue that the Soviet Union and its adopted
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ideology gave access to a new instrument for reaching old
Russian nationalist and imperial goals. Seweryn Bialer
argues that:
"In my opinion, the interaction of the dimensions of Soviet
nationalism - Russian in substance, Soviet in form -
constitutes a crucially important explanatory factor in
Soviet international behavior"
.
[31]
Zbigniew Brzezinski also sees the importance of
historical factors and personal backgrounds of the
Bolsheviks as important for understanding Soviet politics
today, but in his eyes these factors shaped marxism into a
new Soviet-Communist ideology, i.e. there is a new form
ideology that dominates Soviet policies. In his view, other
interpretations such as measures to continue a traditional
Tsarist defense, are simply ignorance
.[ 32
]
Furthermore, because the Soviet system is seen in the
Soviet Union as part of a historical process toward a
defined end, the Soviet leaders are compelled to view any
effort to "stabilize" or to "normalize" the international
situation as a hostile design. From this ideological
proposition follows an attitude of absolute self-
righteousness; compromises will therefore only be accepted
if they permit pursuit of higher ends. [33] In Zbigniew
Brzezinski's view, Soviets' insistence that ultimate peace
depends on the total victory of a particular social system
led by a particular political party creates an element of a
fundamental struggle for survival in international affairs
and conflict resolution is not possible. He argues that
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Soviet foreign policy has a "..militant conception of
relations in which reality is viewed as being a continuing
conflict" and puts much importance to the overall influence
of the so called Soviet-Communist ideology in all the
activities and policies carried out by the Soviet Union in
the international relations system. [34] In Brzezinski's
words
:
"Despite the shifts and turns in Soviet foreign policy in
the last several decades, a persisting attribute of its long
perspective is the sense of compulsive obligation to assist
the spread of communism throughout the world. This
universality of goal makes Soviet foreign policy something
altogether different from Czarist foreign policy". [35]
According to this view, there is a logic of ideological
rules hiding behind Soviet moves, a thoughtful calculation
aiming towards a grand plan. This, long standing, very
common view in the West regards the aggressive nature of
Soviet power as based on an expansionist marxist-leninist
ideology. Paul Dibb summarizes the very traditional Western
view:
"There is a tendency in the West to see every Soviet move as
carefully planned to bolster the USSR's power because the
Soviet Union's leaders allegedly have the advantage of
working within a longrun ideological framework" .[ 36]
It can be argued that there is a "trap" of drawing overly
negative conclusions by interpreting Soviet strategic
behavior according to Western logic or preconceptions. The
difference of heritage between Western thinking and Russian
thinking is essential to understand the complexity of Soviet
international relations, the experience from history, the
facts of geography, and the overlay of ideology. Ideology is
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still important but it should rather be seen as an
instrument providing legitimacy for the regime, a motive
power for achieving goals and justifying certain actions.
Seweryn Bialer has argued the following concerning Soviet
ideology:
"Ideology provides neither a blueprint for Soviet decision
makers nor a guide for Western scholars. It has served to
create Soviet perceptions, inclinations, and predispositions
that are frequently inconsistent among themselves and that
rarely have unambigous implications for action. Its impact
has varied with time, place, and issue, and cannot be
assessed independently of numerous other factors that shape
the character and direction of Soviet international
behavior"
.
[ 37
]
It is certainly convenient to justify controversial
actions by using a suitable ideology in order to serve a
nationalist interest such as the Soviet (and other Soviet
Bloc countries) invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The
history of the Soviet Union shows a nation that has adapted
its international behavior to changing circumstances in
world politics and to its own domestic conditions and
requirements. The traditional Russian preoccupation with
security and a need to be respected as a multi-dimensional
powerful nation have been the dominant considerations in its
relations with other nations.
A continuing negative misperception in the West of
Soviet aims and goals has been answered by similar
misperceptions from the Soviet side. Robert Jervis has
argued that these misperceptions builds upon one after
another into an ever increasing spiral which finally makes
any kind of normalization almost impossible .[ 38 ] Increasing
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misperceptions developed easily into the Cold War. The
international East-West conflict created a very difficult
situation for the Eastern European states and the region's
freedom was severely repressed by the Soviets.
The present political transformation of Eastern Europe
is occuring in a region which still is politically very
sensitive. To avoid setbacks in this process it is very
important that both sides - the Western states and the
Soviet Union - understand more about the opposite partner's
political thinking in order to avoid more misperceptions.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE
4.1 Reasons For Soviet Hegemony
To be able to understand more about the Soviet
political thinking and its view on the relations with the
Eastern European countries it is necessary to analyze why
the Soviets created their hegemony and how they really have
handled it. This should include the reasons why the post-
World War II relationship between the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries was, in most cases, uneasy and
why the present political transformation of Eastern Europe
came so fast as soon as the Soviets loosened their political
grip over the region. By studying how the Soviet Union
managed their relations with the Eastern bloc countries the
West, including the Eastern European countries, will also
learn more about how to handle its own relations to the
Soviet Union.
Even though most of the Eastern European countries in
the post-World War II era have formed a political grouping
and have cooperated with each other on several issues such
as trade and defense, this was a very unnatural and enforced
pattern. The Eastern European countries are very different
ethnically and linguistically as well as in their levels of
cultural, economic, and political development. The region
has, over the history, often seen turmoil and suffering from
being a geographical part under pressure and intervention
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from the Great Powers in their struggle for domination. The
political instability of the region, following from the
power struggle in Europe, has caused tremendous influence on
the continent's destiny. Two world wars started in Eastern
Europe and later disagreement over the political future in
the region was the immediate source of the Cold War.
The historical relations between Russia and Eastern
Europe have been complicated and usually anything but good
neighborly. Poland has fought several wars against Russia,
and the Polish people have a tradition of great antipathy
against the Russians. The Russians have for a long time
regarded Poland as an illegitimate state and, after the
First World War, sometimes simply refered to it as the
Vistula provinces. A similar history of bad relations can be
found between Russia and the Baltic states, Romania, and
Finland. The pattern is the same everywhere - Russia, in
general and with very few exceptions, have had difficult and
mostly bad relations with all its neighbors.
After the First World War and the Russian revolution
the victorious Western states erected a "Cordon Sanitare" in
Eastern Europe as a buffer in the protection of their own
states against the young Soviet state. Some of the Eastern
European states needed Western support for their security
and formed together the so called "Little Entente". The
anti-Soviet orientation of the elites in the countries of
Eastern Europe during the interwar period caused
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considerable damage to the perceived security of the new
state. [1] During this period there were also serious
conflicts among the East European countries over national,
territorial, and other issues caused by the dissolution of
the former Austro-Hungarian empire.
Towards the end of the Second World War the Soviets
invaded one Eastern European country after the other in its
efforts to force the Germans back and to race for the
exciting grand prize Berlin. There is no doubt that the
Soviets had a plan to seize control over these countries. In
the footsteps of the Soviet Red Army followed East European
communists, many former exiles, trained in the Soviet Union
and ready to seize power in the turmoil. [2] The Soviets were
just as ruthless towards former non-enemy countries, such as
Poland, as they were towards ex-enemies. Elections were
canceled or falsified. An extension of the Soviet, former
Russian, empire was created all the way to Central Europe
through the establishment of puppet-states. Stalin was
determined to have full control over the area and turned the
former Western European "Cordon Sanitare" into a Soviet
buffer zone.
There were several reasons for this Soviet move and the
political costs that had to be taken. Probably the most
important factor is the military and security aspects. [3]
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet German zone were seen
as essential for Soviet security. The area provided the
Soviet Union with space for maneuvers and watching well
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forward from the frontier of the Soviet Union. It allowed
the Soviets the possibility of concentrating their forces
well to the west in case of the prospect of an attack.
Another reason for the establishment of a Soviet bloc
was ideological and political. The Eastern European states
formed a valuable support system for Soviet foreign policy
and security goals. The communist countries contributed to
Soviet diplomatic moves and supported Soviet initiatives in
institutions such as the United Nations. The Eastern
European countries were also valuable to the Soviet Union in
controversies with other communist states, such as China,
when the Soviet world communist leadership was challenged.
Thirdly, the formation of the Soviet Bloc also gave the
Soviet Union, at least initially, economic benefits. The
higher industrial and technological development compared to
the Soviet Union in some of the Eastern/Central European
countries has been useful to the Soviet leadership. During
the Stalin era huge reparations were taken out from former
enemy countries in Eastern Europe. Later, during the 1960's
and 1970's, the economic advantage shifted to an economic
burden for the Soviets. Political instability and failure of
the Soviet economic system contributed to this and the
Soviet Union were forced to subsidize and economically
support the bloc nations in its efforts to legitimize the
communist regimes.
The Soviet Union has no natural allies of importance
(in the same way as Great Britain has USA or Sweden has the
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other Scandinavian countries)
. The Soviet Bloc has therefore
generally been perceived among the Soviets of great value to
the Soviet Union in its foreign policies and security
measures. For these reasons the Soviet Union has been
determined to keep complete control over its satellite
states. This has been especially true about the
strategically more important Northern Tier countries, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. While the Southern Tier
countries, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, had more leeway
for own domestic experiments during the 1960's and 1970's,
only orthodox Romania has been allowed to take a more
independent path compared to the other bloc countries. The
reasons for this degree of independence can be explained by
Romania's less geopolitical-strategic importance and its
special authoritarian and isolated characteristics as a
country. [4] It is quite clear that this Romanian development
of a certain degree of independence would not have been
allowed in the pre-Gorbachev era among the other more
strategically important countries, especially the Northern
Tier.
4.2 Hegemonic Control Instruments
The Soviets have had several means of control over the
bloc countries. A Russian characteristic instrument of
control was, what Kristian Gerner calls the "Fraternal
System". [5] This system is based on an intra-bloc network of
a "nomenklatura", a Soviet-bloc elite concisting of pro-
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Soviet leaders on key posts in the bloc countries. From the
Soviet point of view, the Soviet communist party (CPSU) was
seen as the "mother" communist party, the indisputable
leader of the other fraternal communist parties in the bloc.
Appointments to certain particularly important positions in
the bloc countries, such as the Foreign Ministers and the
Defense Ministers, were screened and coordinated by the
Soviets in especially created committees
.[ 6 ] The Soviets
emphasized strong personal relations and confidence in these
matters more than ideology. Christopher Jones stresses that
the major post-Stalin control instrument used by the Soviets
was the communist party network which restrained Eastern
European nationalism with adherence to the proclaimed
communist world leadership, i.e. the Soviet Union (CPSU). [7]
Another integration measure considered necessary to
hinder the rise of a rebellious domestic faction have been
the policy of systematically integrating the different
countries' armies into the supranational Warsaw Pact
network. With the operative command totally in Soviet hands,
the Warsaw Pact also served as a justification for having
Soviet soldiers on East European soil. It also provided the
possibility for a rapid occupation of Eastern Europe by
Soviet soldiers in the dual purpose for defense against NATO
as well as to prevent any defender from trying to break out
of the alliance. [8]
Thirdly, as a response to deteriorating economies
within the Soviet Bloc, the Soviet Union also started an
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effort to integrate the East European countries' economies.
Unstable and worsening economic conditions within the bloc
increasingly threatened Soviet hegemony in the post-Stalin
era. The Soviets found their economic integration plans to
be mostly a failure and had to financially support the
communist regimes in order to try to stabilize the
satellites domestic political conditions.
The extensive Soviet need for control caused a serious
dilemma in the Soviet Bloc; the incompatibility between the
goals of control and stability
.
[9 ] The Soviet Union has
never been able to find the right balance between the two
goals. To be able to uphold their hegemony, the Soviets have
had to give priority to the control goal at the expense of
long-term stability. The reasons for this are several but
they are all based in a traditional Russian heavy-handedness
with relations as well as a popular rejection in Eastern
Europe of the Soviet hegemony, the systems and values
associated with it. This popular rejection has led to
several uprisings which the Soviets have been able to stop
only by the use of force, directly or indirectly. The Soviet
hegemonial experience has been one of force as the only
problem solver. Other efforts, such as cooperation in the
economic field or social and cultural relations outside the
party network, have been continuing failures.
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4.3 Russian and Central East European Political
Culture
The problem for the Soviet leaders are that factors
which appeared to guarantee political stability in the
Soviet Union - such as the autocracy and the preeminence of
the state over the civil society - became sources of
instability when imposed upon countries like Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Hungary. When Soviet communism was forced upon
the countries of Eastern Europe there were existing age-old
traditions of pluralism, consensus, and rational decision-
making, all of which were missing from the Russian
tradition. Russia's experience of societal change was
continual despotic central rule and subjugation of the
people. Czechoslovakia and Poland had traditions of
parliamentarism and Hungary, even though not a developed
democracy, had existing traditions of political pluralism.
Most countries in Eastern Europe shared the heritage of
Western Europe. According to Mihaly Vajda, this was a
specific type of rationality, inherited from the Greeks and
the Jews, a humanism springing from Christianity, and a
concept of law with roots from Rome. Furthermore, the
European states inherited from Christianity the notion of
independence between ideology and power. [10] The Russian
standards were Eastern, inherited from the Byzantine culture
while Eastern Europe was still Europe with its predominately
Western heritage. What was strange to the Central Europeans
was a lack of legality, i.e. predictability and
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accountability in social and political life. The Hungarian
dissident sociologist Mihaly Vajda expresses the peculiar
Russian character in the following terms:
"What was lacking in Russia - and I fear that this is still
the case today - is the need and capacity for a democratic
decision-making process, i.e. something which is not a
question of character or tolerance. What in my view is
lacking is the existence of a rational attitude" .[ ll
]
Kristian Gerner argues that, generally among Central
European intellectuals, Soviet marxism is seen as another
expression of the Russian lack of order and rationality, and
not as a part of Western thinking. [ 12 ] Marxism did not
regard freedom of private property as a base for personal
freedom. The efficiency and rationality of marginal utility
is missing from marxist economics as well as the
psychological relationship consisting of the ideas of
legitimate conflict and competition. The market place,
whether for goods or ideas, is seen as irrational,
dangerous, and anarchic. It can be argued that societies
with already developed markets, competition and
individuality, have experienced marxism as an inefficient
and unequal system compared to earlier practice. The results
have been unstability and revolts. Status quo has only been
brought back through Soviet force.
In the Soviet Union marxism has not created the same
responses and the reasons for this can be traced in the
characteristics of Russian political as well as social
culture. The Russians do not have any entrepreneurial
tradition - in the Western sense - to act as a counterweight
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to central planning. Furthermore, there has not existed,
until quite recently, a middle class to counterweigh the
ruling elite. Mihaly Vajda argues that it was "..those
backward Russian conditions themselves which made possible
to experiment with this sort of concept of socialism in the
first place"
.
[ 13
]
The Soviet political culture which was forced upon the
Central European countries in the Soviet search for
hegemony, brought a permanent source of conflict and a
potential threat to the stability of the Soviet security
system.
4.4 Important Criteria in the Soviet/Eastern European
Relationship
Soviet control of Eastern Europe has changed over the
post-World War II era from absolute control and domination
during Stalin's leadership to the acceptance of a more
heterogeneous bloc through Khrushchev's "New Course" policy.
This change meant moving towards an acceptance of the
natural differences between the Eastern European countries
and a gradual decentralization. But certain aspects of
Soviet policy have, until very recently, remained the same;
Eastern Europe has continued to be regarded as a Soviet
military buffer zone. [14] Certainly the Soviet Bloc has, as
earlier mentioned, also provided the Soviet Union with a
group of allies which under "normal" circumstances would not
have been natural for the Soviet Union. But the feeling of
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security among the Soviet leaders, provided by the
geographic location of the bloc countries, has though been
seen by many researchers as the dominating issue. [15]
Charles Gati argues that the Soviet Union's policy
towards Eastern Europe has been one of traditional
hegemonial aspirations combined with an uneven and grudging
pragmatism. [ 16] Deviations among the bloc countries in
efforts to adapt to local conditions, traditions, and
customs have been allowed as long as each specific country
was not perceived among the Soviet leaders as a potential
threat to the stability of the bloc. There is no doubt that
this Soviet perception of what constitutes security threats
is very sensitive (for historical reasons as earlier
discussed) and, more or less, unknown to its satellites.
The bloc countries have experienced a post-World War
II period of trial and error and it can be argued that these
security considerations are still not known because of
changes within the Soviet Union itself as well as in the
Western world. The Hungarians mistook the signals from
Khrushchev as permission to act freely in their own
interest. The proclaiming of Hungarian neutrality then led
to the tragedy of 1956. The Czechoslovak party's reform
program, without the intention of changing the power
balance, led to the Soviet invasion of 1968. Kristian Gerner
argues that this drastic intervention was made because the
Soviet Union had not yet reached a stable political
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agreement/settlement with West Germany and therefore felt
insecure about the European political situation. [ 17
]
Another important factor could also be the Soviet
uncertainty of the Western countries' potential intentions
to exploit the situation. After Radar's assumption of power
in Hungary in 1956, and later established confidence with
his leadership among the Soviet leaders, Hungary was allowed
to embark on a drastic deviation from the Soviet model. The
creation of the "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM) meant a
radical (for a Soviet communist country at the time)
experimentation with market-based allocation of goods. It
can be argued that Hungary's success in this matter was
possible because the Soviet communist party perceived its
security criteria as fulfilled and therefore could adopt a
certain degree of pragmatism. [ 18
]
As the above examples show there are a wide range of
different factors and explanations to each situation. The
high complexity of the political relations between the
Soviet Union and the bloc countries even increases when one
realizes the unfamiliarity among most of the Europeans with
the Soviet mind and reactions.
The ultimate factor though in almost all situations
have been the vital Soviet need of security. As long as this
security has been guaranteed, pragmatism has in most cases
prevailed over ideology and uniformity. When this has not
been the case, Eastern Europe have had to bear the brunt.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH FINLAND
5.1 A Historical Perspective
Finland as a real sovereign nation had never existed
before the day of independence on the sixth of December
1917. Finland had been a "piece" in the power gamble between
Sweden and Russia and this was reflected in the freguent
shifts of its eastern border with Russia.
Though continously being victimized in this power
struggle, the region of Finland had for a long time been
able to pursue its own policies in a rather independent way.
Under Swedish rule from the 15th to the early 19th century,
the Finns had not only been able to create their own
domestic policies but later also a foreign policy distinct
from the Swedish. Towards the end of the eighteenth century
an increasing nationalism started and the first plans to
achieve national independence were made.
Russia had had a long traditional strategic interest of
reaching the shores of the Baltic Sea and the possible
control of the waterways this could give them. Peter I had
clearly demonstrated Russian interest of the region by
laying the foundations of St. Petersburg (later Leningrad)
at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland and by making the
town the Russian capital in 1712.
After the Napoleonic wars Russia came out as a victor
and in its attempt to secure its northwestern border
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regions, Sweden was forced to cede Finland to in 1809. There
were now great hopes among the Finns of the possible first
steps towards independence. The conqueror, Tsar Alexander I,
showed a pragmatic view on Finland. In order to gain
allegiance from the Finns he granted Finland extensive
autonomy and even its own defense forces. The Finns were
citizens of Finland as well as subjects of the Tsar.
Relations with Russia were, from the Finnish point of view,
just like foreign policy.
Finnish nationalism continued to grow rapidly, and by
the end of the nineteenth century the Russians faced a
politically sophisticated autonomous nation at the
"doorstep" of the capital. This fact was to have serious
consequences for the Finns at this time and again later
(which reached its height during the wars of 1939 and 1941)
.
The Russian sense of a new strategically vulnerable area
changed its policy towards Finland. A period of oppression
started in 1899 and was increased again in 1907. The reasons
for the revitalization of the oppression were several. The
policy of Russification of Finland had created severe
domestic tension between Finns and Russians. Also important
was the fact that Finland was much better off than the rest
of the empire because of its autonomy. This ran contrary to
the traditional Russian state interests of denying any
advantages to its peripheral territories.
The Finnish independence fighters collaborated at this
time with the Russian revolutionary movement despite.
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political views. Simultaneously, underground
relations with Germany were increasing rapidly and Germany
became to be seen as the possible and needed supporter for
the independence of Finland. (Contacts with Sweden was also
established at this time but the Swedish reaction was cold
and dissociated)
. At the outbreak of the First World War
several thousand Finns received military training in Germany
and the activist spirit was at the top.
In 1917, when the time finally came to a total collapse
of Russia and the Bolshevik government was set up, a
delegation led by the future President Svinhufvud managed to
receive independence of Finland from the now newly
established Soviet of the People's Commissars. Lenin gave an
easy approval for the Finnish quest of independence.
According to Roy Allison, the reasons for this was that
Lenin, who had lived in Finland, knew of the traditional
Finnish hatred of Russian chauvinism and was convinced that,
sooner or later, a revolution would be carried out by the
Finnish workers. [1] This would crush the Finnish prevailing
bourgeois system and create a reunification of Finland with
the Soviet Union.
Although Lenin's government had been the first to
recognize the independence of Finland, the Russians remained
in Finnish eyes the natural enemy of the country's freedom.
The newly elected conservative Svinhufvud government in
Finland personified this feeling of distrust. The only solid
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force against Russian communism seemed to be the Kaiser's
Germany and Finland's foreign policy was therefore anchored
to German support. This support could also, eventually, help
Finland to expand beyond its historical borders to include
the Finnish speaking parts of eastern Karelia. A German
prince was elected as king of Finland and this move was
expected to secure German commitment to Finnish independence
from the Soviet Union. Naturally, with the capitulation of
Germany in 1918 Finnish policy had to make a complete
change. (The German king-elect abdicated without even
setting his foot on Finnish soil)
.
The Finnish civil war broke out in January 1918. The
country saw two fractions fighting each other; the Whites
and the Reds. It was clear that the Whites had the overall
support among the Finns because of the traditional antipathy
against the Russians. [2] Russian troops had joined the Reds
in the civil war and this was considered as reason for an
existing state of war between Finland and the Soviet Union.
The Whites dominated and finally achieved victory. The civil
war even increased the already widespread Finnish hatred of
the Russians, and Finnish collaborators with the Russians
had to flee the country.
The peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union
was signed in October 1920. The Finnish former borders were
recognized with the addition of Petsamo which gave the Finns
access to the Arctic Sea. The Soviet Union, in its weak
position, could not achieve its earlier demand for
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additional ground on the Karelian Isthmus and some islands
in the Gulf of Finland to provide defense depth of
Leningrad. This traditional Russian need for security was
not forgotten, and the Second World War period reactivated
the demands.
The new Finnish policies were first anchored in
alliances with other nations but this was finally rejected
as unrealistic. (An alliance with Poland was at hand in
1922) . Instead Finland sought security through the League of
Nations during the 1920's, and later during the 1930's, when
the League of Nations seemed to fail its purpose, Finland
adopted a policy of "Scandinavian neutrality" and made
efforts to develop closer ties to Sweden. Especially
military cooperation was at issue.
The role of the Prime Minister Paasikivi, who had the post
during the interwar years, was important for Finland's
future relations with the Soviet Union. By the 1920 's
Paasikivi was one of the few Finnish politicians who
understood the consequences for Finland because of the
possible changes of power balance in Europe in favor to the
Soviet Union. Roy Allison argues that "Paasikivi foresaw the
need to accomodate Soviet security needs". [3]
During the early 1930 's the Soviet Union made new
initiatives to secure the defense of Leningrad either
through some Finnish territorial concessions or through a
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formal defense pact. All such proposals were rejected by
Finland on the grounds that Finland's neutrality would be
compromised. Instead, before the outbreak of the Second
World War the Finnish government tried to convince the
Soviet Union that Finland was firm on its neutrality and
would defend itself from all attacks by foreign countries.
It was very important for the Finnish government to convince
the Soviet Union that Finland was not pro-German. The
Soviets continued their demands for a western security. The
Finnish/Soviet talks regarding arrangements for Leningrad
broke down in 1938. This was crucial for the attack by the
Soviets which led to the "Winter War" in 1939 after the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. [4] Finland had finally, in 1940, to
cede to the Soviet Union a large part of the Karelian
Isthmus and some land for a Soviet military base southwest
of The Finnish capital Helsinki. Also a part in the north,
on Finland's eastern border had to be ceded. The Soviet
security system continued in its traditional path. Jakobson
concluded that "Stalin's plan for the security of Leningrad
seemed to be based on the defense system of the Tsars". [5]
During the "Winter War" the Soviets also made an attempt to
establish a satellite regime in Finland. The effort was
headed by a Finnish communist in Soviet exile, Kuusinen, who
did not have a chance to succeed in establishing a "people's
democratic republic" of Finland in the prevailing extreme
anti-Russian climate within Finland.
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The fierce anti-Russian feelings that followed the
Winter War caused a revanchism which came to dominate the
country and which made Finland, if not directly at least
indirectly, an ally of Germany in the Barbarossa operation
against the Soviet Union. Not much had been learned from
history, and Finland ended up on the losing side of World
War II and had to cede more territory to the Soviet Union.
The whole of the Karelian Isthmus, plus the region of
Petsamo and the landslip towards the Arctic Sea, had to be
ceded outright. In addition a fifty year lease of the
Porkkala Peninsula on the southern coast of Finland for the
creation of a Soviet naval base had to be granted. All these
acquisitions, except for the Petsamo region, were in line
with the traditional Russian definitions of defense needs
for the security of Leningrad.
After the Second World War Finland was almost in the
hands of the Soviet Union and virtually "written off" by
other countries. [6] When it comes to Finland's political
position, the year of 1944 is usually seen as year zero
among Finnish politicians. [7] To Finland's advantage was
that the nation had never been conquered during the world
war. This was the only factor the Finnish politicians could
build upon during the immediate post-World War II era.
Otherwise, most factors were against Finland at this time.
The country had collaborated with the Soviet Union's most
feared enemy, Germany. It had been part of historic Russia
and had a tradition of antipathy against the Russians.
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5.2 Post-World War II Relations
It was obvious to Finnish leaders after the world war
that the only possible policy to adopt was one of assuring
the Soviet Union that Soviet security interests in the
northwest can be attained with the existence of an
independent sovereign Finnish state. [8] Finland's long
history of relations with Russia had created a unique
experience among the Finns of how to deal with the Russians.
One of Finland's most valuable assets in the post-World War
II era was the ability, at least to some extent, to read the
Russian mind and pick up the work on a long-term strategy of
convincing the Soviet Union to trust Finland.
Paasikivi was elected President of Finland in 1946.
This was an important choice because Paasikivi, though being
a conservative and anti-communist politician, was an early
advocate of good relations with the Soviet Union, and well
known among the Soviets after leading the Finnish
delegations of the 1920 Civil War treaty, the Winter War
negotiation, and the 1944 treaty. Paasikivi 's task was now
to convince the Soviets to trust an independent Finland, and
equally important, to make the Finnish people accept to the
facts of the power situation and cooperate in achieving the
Soviets' confidence
.
[ 9
]
The immediate path to attain Soviet confidence was to
show Finland's willingness to pay its war reparations in
full, decline the invitation to join the Marshall Plan, and
to prosecute the politicians most responsible for Finland s
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entry into the war against the Soviet Union. According to
Max Jakobson, there can be no doubt that the Finnish
performance impressed the leaders in the Kremlin. [10]
In the West, however, this policy of Paasikivi was
regarded as naive. The peak event for the critics of the
Paasikivi-line seemed to have come in the turbulent year of
1948. Paasikivi received a personal letter from Stalin
asking Finland to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance,
similar to the treaties the Soviet Union had shortly earlier
concluded with Hungary and Romania. Finland, as Stalin
pointed out, was now the only European country neighboring
the Soviet Union which had not yet made a defense agreement
with the Soviet Union. The letter, which was received at the
climax of the Czechoslovak coup, caused great alarm in
Finland. Paasikivi's tactics was now a policy of obstruction
combined with the working out of a plan how to get out of
the dilemma. When the Finnish delegation finally, a month
later, arrived to Moscow, their instructions were not to
accept any treaty that would in effect make Finland an ally
of the Soviet Union in potential conflicts between East and
West. The proposals towards the Soviets should follow
Paasikivi ' s policy of a limited accomodation which
essentially meant a Finnish foreign policy based on a desire
to avoid being drawn into the conflicts and controversies
between the Great Powers and therefore resist any
commitments, not just to the Soviet Union but to any great
power.
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The Soviets, led by the usually stubborn Foreign
Minister Molotov, gave way to the Finnish line and a wholly
new and changed treaty was signed. The reasons why the
Soviet government so readily accepted the Finnish draft for
a treaty could be several, very different ones. Max Jakobson
gives a few explanations
.[ 11] First, Paasikivi's tactic of
slow tempo had surely strengthened the Finnish position. The
Western powers had taken rapid steps, after the Czechoslovak
coup, to organize their common defense. Second, Stalin's
quarrel with Tito was at its height and the Soviet
government did not want more problems at the moment. But
simpler explanations could also be at hand. Max Jakobson
stresses Stalin's familiarity with the history of Finland,
the Finnish mood, and the potential for a great anti-Russian
feeling. Also, somewhat more speculative, is the
argumentation that Stalin had an admiration and even fear
for the fierce Finnish fighting which was well demonstrated
during the Winter War. Roy Allison argues that the Soviets
feared that a transformation of Finland to a satellite would
inevitably frighten Scandinavia into close military
cooperation with the West. [12] Norway was already on the
move towards NATO but Sweden seemed inclined to stay
neutral
.
The 1948 Treaty marked the beginning of a separate and
stable Soviet policy towards Finland. But it was influenced,
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especially during periods of tension in Europe, by Soviet
designs or hopes for the Nordic region as a whole.
Stalin died in 1953 and Soviet foreign policy soon,
with the rise of Khrushchev, eased up somewhat. This was
also felt in Finland. In 1955, at the same time as the
Soviet Union finally concluded a peace treaty with Austria
in exchange for neutrality, an offer was sent to Finland.
The Soviet Union would return the Porkkala Peninsula, used
for a Soviet military base, to Finland if the treaty of 1948
was prolonged twenty years. Paasikivi had managed in 1948 to
limit the treaty to ten years. The return of the Porkkala
base to Finland meant the elimination of the only obstacle
to a genuine Finnish neutrality and there was no hesitation
from the Finnish side to prolong the 1948 Treaty. Time had
shown that the treaty worked without disturbances between
the two countries. The Soviets' reasons for the deal was
quite obvious. The leaders of the Kremlin were unsure about
the Finnish policy after Paasikivi, who was old and ready to
retire when his term of office ran out in 1956, and
therefore wanted to make sure that the 1948 Treaty was
continued. Secondly, the strategic use of a naval base at
the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, to protect Leningrad,
was already out of date when it was established. In a time
of long range nuclear missiles the Soviet leaders had
finally realized this.
Kekkonen was elected President in 1956. He was closely
committed to the foreign policy of Paasikivi, a policy later
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known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, and had participated
in many negotiations with the Soviet Union during times of
Finnish crises. In a time when the bloc formation was
finished Kekkonen's saw his task as to develop an
international understanding of Finnish neutrality.
At the end of the 1950's additional dangerous tensions
started to occur between the superpowers which naturally
caused fear among the European countries. Again, Germany was
the issue that alarmed the Soviets. According to Roy
Allison, "the entry of West Germany into NATO and the
subsequent rearmament of the country was crucial in the
formulation of Soviet strategic thinking"
.[ 13 ] Roy Allison
points out that these events contributed to the change in
the Soviet attitude towards Scandinavia. The main reasons
for this attitude change was the rapid growth of the West
German fleet in the Baltic and its military cooperation with
Denmark. [14] Max Jakobson also sees the West German
rearmament as a direct cause for changes in the Soviet
attitude towards Scandinavia and agrees with Roy Allison
that these events were the only precipitants of the so
called "Note Crisis" of 1961.
The crisis began with a Soviet proposal for Finnish-
Soviet consultations about military cooperation as provided
in accordance with the 1948 Treaty. The consultations
should, according to the Soviets, deal with "..measures to
secure the defense of the borders of both countries on
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account of the threat of military attack which has arisen
from West Germany and the states allied with it".
[
15 ]
Kekkonen was convinced that this crisis was not simply a
cr is is in Finnish-Soviet relations but one between the
Western and the Soviet Blocs. [16] Kekkonen's decision was
then to try to convince Khrushchev and the other Soviet
leaders what harm moves toward closer military integration
with Finland would cause. He was going to refer to potential
tensions in the Scandinavian countries. Kekkonen built his
decision of persuasion on his personal standing with the
Soviet leaders. According to Roy Allison, Kekkonen found out
that what the Soviet leaders really demanded was just a ’
continuation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, i.e. the chosen
Finnish foreign policy. [17] Kekkonen succeeded in his talks
with the Kremlin leaders and Khrushchev stated that the two
countries should agree that if the situation were to grow
worse they would arrange to contact each other again. Later
Kekkonen argued that the whole crisis was just a matter of
Soviet relations of confidence with Finland.
According to Raimo Vayrynen, the period of instability
in Finnish-Soviet relations extending from 1958 to 1962, was
a lesson to the Finnish leaders. Kekkonen's extensive
travelling to the West, including the Neutrals, seeking to
establish new relations in the name of a new Finnish
neutrality, had made the Soviet leaders suspicious. Finland
then learned to rely on a so-called "pre-emptive" policy
which strives, as a preparation for other policies, to
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stabilize the immediate environment of Finland and the
European continent as well. [18] Finland should be eager to
support stability in the form of detente, disarmament etc.
without leaning to either side of the bloc formation.
The basic line of Finnish security policy after 1961
has then been to preserve Soviet trust in the Finnish
preparedness to fulfill the 1948 Treaty if and when the need
arose. [19] The consequence of this security policy has been
a Finnish foreign policy to serve the interests of a long
term stability strategy in the Nordic region so as to avoid
making the Soviets feel a need to putting the treaty in
action.
Soviet interference in Finland's internal affairs has
been only indirect, and only on very few occasions.
According to Roy Allison, the period when Soviet
interference in Finland came closest was under Khrushchev's
height of dominance in the Soviet Union. [20] The most
explicit example is the so called "Night Frost Crisis" of
1958-59. This was a period of harsh political remarks from
the Soviet leaders, and economic sanctions. The reasons for
Soviet action were unwanted politicians in the newly formed
coalition government. In addition to the Agrarians, the
coalition included Social Democrats and Conservatives. The
Social Democrats had been seen as a party hostile to the
Soviet Union since the Second World War because it was the
Social Democratic Prime Minister at the time, Tanner, who
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had sanctioned the "Continuing War" of 1941 against the
Soviets. The Soviet leaders labeled most Social Democrats as
Tannerites . The Conservatives had always been seen with
suspicious eyes by the Soviets because of their traditional
anti-Russian feelings. The result of the pressure was
positive from a Soviet point of view. The coalition finally
broke up and the Agrarians, a middle-of-the-road right wing
party trusted by the Soviet leaders, formed a minority
government. Roy Allison argues that a study of how this
crisis was initiated and solved, shows Soviet interests as
practical rather than ideological. This interference that
developed tensions as well as the other crises of 1948 and
1961, coincided with international political unrest. [21]
5.3 Implications and Peculiarities of the Soviet-
Finnish Relationship
The fact that Finland is a small nation and was
politically very weak in the immediate post-war years, and
neighboring a great power which transformed very much of
Europe through its success in the Second World War, has
forced Finland to adjust its external, and to some degree,
even internal politics. Finland has developed a Realpolitik
in the form of so called "Neighborhood" politics. This is
very well expressed by the following quote:
"In the totality of Finnish foreign policy, the policy of
neutrality is the second main element — in time and in order
of significance - after Eastern policy". [22]
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Finland must first meet the jointly direct or indirect
agreed "rules of behavior" when determining the policy of
neutrality. These rules have been worked out by the two
partners through frequent interaction during the post-World
Wsr II era. During this time Finland have had to learn some
Soviet "rules" through trial and error while the Soviet
Union has adjusted and relaxed some of its initially very
tough policies towards Finland. According to Kari Mottola,
the crucial test of Finnish statecraft is fitting the two
strands of policy - neutrality and Eastern policy - so that
they do not contradict or harm one another, but instead form
a working line of overall policy. The justification for this
complicated form of "Neighborhood" politics is based on
shared roots of geography and history, and the essential
fact that the Soviet Union is Finland's neighbor and that
nothing can be done about it except cooperation. [23 ] A
strategy of cooperation was seen among the Finnish
politicians as the only way to secure and later increase the
nation's freedom.
This approach to foreign policy has often caused
accusations that Finland acts as a vehicle for sponsoring
Soviet interests in the Northern region as well as in other
parts of the world. Roy Allison denies this in the
conclusion of his analysis. Looking at the recent history of
Finnish-Soviet relations, what Finland is doing in these
situations is just to work for its own security .[ 24
]
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The clearest example of this is the 1961 "Note Crisis"
where unrest in Central Europe easily spread to the Baltic
region. An inactive Finland caused the Soviet leaders to
feel insecure about Finland's position. Finland must
therefore, as a neutral country, actively work with policies
of international conflict resolution, peace, and security.
When it comes to Finland's internal politics it is
obvious that the Soviet leaders are interested in securing
reliable persons, with the "right" backgrounds, on the more
important posts. The person as such has always been more
important than ideology to the Soviet leaders. The
Presidents of Finland have always been right-wing
politicians, and not until 1982, when Koivisto succeeded
Kekkonen, did a left-wing President enter the highest
political post in Finland. A clear example in this case was
the 1956 presidential election where the Soviet leaders
explicitly supported the conservative politician Kekkonen
instead of the Social Democrat Fagerholm. Kekkonen was known
by the Soviet leaders and committed to Paasikivi's policies.
The security Kekkonen' s person meant to the Soviet leaders
overshadowed ideology.
From the Soviet point of view the special relationship
with Finland has had several very valuable implications. The
rather smooth relationship with a Western capitalistic
system has been used by the Soviet leaders as a working
example of peaceful coexistence or even as a model for a new
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order of East-West relations. This has unfortunately aroused
deep suspicions in the West to Finland's disadvantage. The
unique relationship has also provided a test ground for the
Soviet leaders to test and evaluate economic policies
towards capitalistic countries. Apart from this, it has also
created a mutually rewarding trade between the countries.
The Soviet Union has had access to an input of modern
technology, and Finland an access to a huge market. The
trading interests have also been important for maintaining
good relations. The trade between the two countries has
grown very large and are now one of the most important
trading channels between East and West.
There are several aspects that have formed the special
peculiarities in the Soviet-Finnish relationship. In order
to understand the Soviet-Finnish case, and to make use of
the long Finnish experience of uncoding Soviet behavior and
intentions, it is necessary to sort out the aspects, or
peculiarities, which make this case of relations unique. It
is important to know what basic facts differentiate Soviet-
Finnish relations from Soviet-Eastern European relations. By
knowing these special aspects and their influence on the
case there are certain generalities which we can make and
apply to the Eastern European region as a whole.
There are three general peculiarities which are
overall important in the case:
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First, history is undoubtedly a factor that has formed the
post-World War II relationship. The long history in common
as regions neighboring each other, and later in almost all
of the nineteenth century, and in the beginning of the
twentieth century when Finland made up a part of the Russian
empire, have created a knowledge in Russia as well as in
Finland about the character of the opposite partner. The
Soviet leaders ' knowledge about the Finns and the Finns'
experience from frequent contacts through history with the
Russians, have by all means created an understanding of how
the other partner will react and/or behave. In short, there
are two different cultures that have learned, at least to
some extent, to understand each other. One could argue that
Finland is one of the few countries in- Europe or maybe even
the only country in Europe, which have this special "asset".
It is obvious that this aspect has very much helped the
Finns in building up a new relationship with the Soviet
Union after World War II.
Second, Finland has been fortunate enough to have
another "asset" in their relationship with the Soviet Union.
The post-World War II era has been marked in Finland by two
long term-sitting leaders, Paasikivi from 1946-56, and
Kekkonen from 1956-81. With only two leaders under such a
long time, stability in policies is a natural outcome. The
two Presidents have been pragmatic and wise leaders with
personalities suitable to the Soviet leaders. As Roy Allison
has pointed out, -the personal commitment to a certain policy
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that Paasikivi came to represent was most important to the
Soviet leaders. [25] In fact, before the so called
"Paasikivi-line" was established, the Soviet leaders tried
to stop the possible reelection of Paasikivi in 1950 because
of the president's conservative affiliation. This, they did
not succeed in, but when Paasikivi 's policy was clear the
Kremlin leaders made a complete turnaround and even awarded
Paasikivi the Lenin Order.
Kekkonen made more emphasis than Paasikivi in the role
of a President as a personal guarantor of the Finnish
foreign policy. His outspoken idea was to "ingrain" the idea
of the special political position and neutrality of Finland
so enduringly in the Soviet people and leadership, that it
would continue also in possible new circumstances.
The results of the two Presidents' activities have been an
atmosphere of indirect dialogues, and problem-solving
attitude between the two countries which have few, if any,
similarities among Western European countries.
Third, there is an aspect that has to be seen in light
of an internal characteristic of Finnish society. This
aspect explains why it has been possible to follow policies
towards the Soviet Union which seems harsh or even unfair to
the Finns, especially when seen from a historical point of
view, with the great Finnish antipathy against the Russians.
The answer is a traditional, though mostly democratic,
authoritarianism that is part of the Finnish political
culture. [26] It is common among the Finns to admire and to
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follow, without too much critical interrogation, the
stipulations laid out by their leaders. Strong political
leaders have been able to make controversial descisions and
demand adherance to these policies with very little
opposition. Within the politically democratic context in
Finland there is an acceptance and obedience among the Finns
of almost authoritarian character. The Finnish political
culture is much more conservative and uncritical than those
of the nearby Scandinavian countries.
Finland's future relations with the Soviet Union do not
appear likely to change. Many of the relations have already
by this time established traditions, such as the now
outdated 1948 Treaty which still is renewed after each
period almost like a festive ritual. Even though the long-
term relations between Finland and the Soviet Union have not
changed over the years since World War II, the strategical
importance of Northern Europe has changed remarkably. Due to
major Soviet naval and air bases in the Kola Peninsula, just
east of northern Finland, and very close to the neighboring
NATO-member country of Norway, Northern Europe is today of
considerable strategic importance. This sector is very
important because of the straits in the Barents, Norwegian,
and Baltic Seas. [27]
Finland's geopolitical situation is more sensitive than
ever. It is therefore to a great advantage for the Finns
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that they have managed to win the confidence among the
Soviet leaders.
5.4 The Case of Finland: Conclusion
The example of Finland is a living evidence of good
relations between East and West. Both countries have a good
use of each other and it is absolutely obvious that neither
of the two countries wants to abolish this special situation
of relations. [28]
Finland could have been taken, just like
Czechoslovakia, by the Soviets in the turbulent bloc
formation following immediately after the end of World War
II. Because of Finland's situation as "written off" among
the Western powers in 1944-45, the Soviet Union would only
have had to pay a political cost of an occupation which
probably would not have mattered anyway in this time. To
Finland's great advantage was that the country had not been
occupied by Soviet troops during the war. But the most
important factor, and the difference between Finland and
Czechoslovakia at the time, was geographical. In the
immediate post-World War II years there was an immense fear
among the Soviet leaders against Germany, and Czechoslovakia
had to serve as a "buffer" state.
But in the case of Finland the Soviet intentions have
shown to be almost surprisingly pragmatic and not at all as
intrusive as is commonly believed. In almost all cases wheie
Finland has had to comply with the Soviet Union it has been
a matter of security interests from the Soviet side.
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Ideology, if any, has always come second in importance after
security. Furthermore, as explaining Soviet preoccupation
with security interests instead of ideology, is the fact
that political crises in Finland, which have been caused by
the Soviet Union, have had a positive variation with
international unrest.
[
29 ]
Then, what could be learned from the very well working
experience of Soviet-Finnish relations? To summarize this
case study:
First, the case points out that the Soviet Union has a
history of being pragmatic in cooperation with countries of
other social and political systems. Ideology has not been
such an important aspect as is commonly believed.
Second, what follows from above is that security is the
primary occupation among the Soviet leaders. In cases when
this security is not fulfilled, ideology has served as a
justification for achieving the felt need of security.
Third, the lessons learned by Finland, and the special
peculiarities caused by its historical and internal
situation, has made Finland a possible forerunner and symbol
for a working relationship between a Western market oriented
society and the Soviet Union. This is important none the
less to the Soviets themselves. The relationship has proven
to be advantageous for both partners as long as the
sensitive Soviet security interests/perceptions have been
fulfilled.
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The Soviet-Finnish case describes how two political
cultures have learned to cooperate intensively in order to
create security and economic advantages for both partners.
In many ways the Soviet-Finnish relations are a pioneer case
which has broken ground for the "New Thinking" in the Soviet
Union. In this sense the Soviet-Finnish relations have quite
an important connection to Eastern Europe. It can be argued
that the Soviets would like to see similar good and trouble
free relations with its former East European empire.
Therefore, the Soviet Union has no need, and now not even
the possibility, of subsidizing a political system which
does not work properly. When the Soviets return the
political freedom to the Eastern European countries a
situation of compatibility will gradually occur between the
political culture and the political system and finally
create stability and efficiency in this region. When this
happen it is important for future stability, that Eastern
Europe takes a political position in relation to the Soviet
Union which is similar to Finland's and accept this.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE'S POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
6.1 The Soviet Domestic Dimension
To be able to understand the present Soviet thinking
and possible future scenarios, none the less what should be
a proper position and strategy of the West, one should ask:
Why is the Soviet Union withdrawing from Eastern Europe?
It is not the commonly believed "death of communism", nor a
Soviet readiness to compromise about its security due to its
present economical weakness. On the contrary, the Soviet
reforms under Gorbachev are efforts to increase the security
of the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger has remarked that
"unlike Brezhnev, who was above all concerned with
safeguarding the status quo in Europe, Gorbachev seems
intent on weakening the Western alliance"
.[ 1 ] Henry
Kissinger claims that Gorbachev's promotion of a "common
European house", extending from the Urals to the Atlantic,
and supposed to act as a safeguard for European civilization
and security, is evidence for this statement. This Soviet
strategy would try to exclude American influence in Europe,
i.e. try to cut off the Atlantic linkage.
The latter part of the Brezhnev era, marked with
stagnation and status quo preserving attitude, contributed
not only to a period of economic and continuing
technological deterioration compared to the West, but also
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to a lack of new ideas and modernized thinking necessary to
coping with changes in the world. The Soviet security system
was one of many issues that were lagging behind in time.
Kristian Gerner, discussing Soviet security reasons to
maintain its hegemony over Eastern Europe, argues that:
"The interaction of many factors of different kinds has made
the Soviet security system politically unstable and
insufficient to guarantee by political means the degree of
security which the Soviet leaders deem necessary". [2]
The Brezhnev generation experienced the construction of
a powerful nation and the sacrifices and suffering that were
made in this effort. This experience seemed to have made
them determined to preserve their achievments at any price.
Eastern Europe was, without any considerations among the
Soviet leaders, seen as a vital part in the Soviet security
system.
A generational change in leadership was necessary to,
or at least facilitated, an important change in thinking.
Robert Legvold argues that "Gorbachev has radically altered
the Soviet concept of national security, or at least, the
framework within which it is discussed" .[ 3 ] Gorbachev has
raised the more fundamental questions of what constitutes
national security in the late twentieth century and how
Soviet Union should act without becoming its own worst
enemy. In Legvold' s view, Gorbachev has come to answers that
no previous Soviet leader had thought of. First, the
Gorbachev regime concluded that military power by itself is
an insufficient base for national security. Second, it has
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acknowledged the link between national and mutual
security. [4
]
This is close to a revolution in Soviet political
thinking. Soviet leaders now realize that their very strong
preoccupation with military power threatens the country from
the "inside" by using up resources needed for long-term
stability and security. Also, a relaxation of aggressive
security measures and ideology will lesser tensions with
other countries and therefore contribute to a mutual
security and stability. It can be argued that Soviet
experience from hegemonic ambitions over Eastern Europe and
rewarding relationships with neutral capitalistic countries
have contributed greatly to these new understandings.
Many sovietologists argue that the Soviet bloc, i.e.
the Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, has been a constant
problem and a source of insecurity for the Soviet Union
instead of the intended security. [5] Through a "hands-off"
strategy, the Soviet Union could achieve a higher security
to a lesser cost than efforts to preserve Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe. [6] A Soviet gesture of goodwill through
withdrawing its control and gradually granting a neutral
status to the East European countries, should result in an
Eastern European appeasement towards the Soviet Union, i.e.
a support of Soviet security needs from these countries. It
is quite obvious that the Soviet Union sees a relationship
similar to Finland and Austria as the ideal one. The Soviet
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experience from these relationships are fruitful and very
good, especially the Soviet-Finnish experience. In fact,
after confidence has been won among the Soviet leaders, the
rewards of the relationship have been mutual. Finland and
Austria have had access to a big, unexploited market and the
Soviet Union have had access to quality products and
technology which are needed for its modernization. At the
same time the Soviet Union has felt its security needs
stable and guaranteed.
However, a future political transformation of central
Eastern Europe to the establishment of nations similar to
Finland and Austria, naturally requires stability in the
Soviet Union, and an . acceptance of cooperation with the
West. Beside the short-term threat of economic failure, the
most important long-term threats to the stability, i.e. the
recent undertaken reform work and the increasing openness to
the West, can be summarized as first, a strong sense of
nationalism among the Russians, second the traditional
Russian Slavic notion of a separate way from the West, and
last but certainly not least, the Russian security
"paranoia". The security issue will be extra important in a
period of necessary reform because, as we can witness today,
an empire held together by force will be in a potential
turmoil when this force is renounced as an instrument of
cohesion. This unrest in the Soviet empire could bring a
direct attack on the present reform work through alarming
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the most critical Russian factor; the sensitive security
perception.
Strong Russian nationalism and patriotism have been
used in order to support the Soviet leaders construction of
an empire. Adam Ulam writes the following;
It can be argued that for the ruling elite, success in
policy and growth in external power of the Soviet
state has become the principal means of legitimizing its
policy system". [7]
Russian and later Soviet conquering of land and prestige
building, if not through war and politics through space
programs and athletes, have brought stability and a
willingness to face hardships and low consumerism. If this
statement is correct, a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern
Europe and threat of a dismantled Soviet Union could easily
cut the support to the present regime and bring forward
reactionary and highly nationalistic elements.
In close connection to the Russian nationalism is the
Slavophiles' idea or myth of a separate way for the
Russians, different and better from the Western system as
well as any other system. The Slavophiles, who easily
influence Russian nationalists, reject both Western
liberalism and Soviet history. They seek solutions in
Russia's prerevolutionary past, in authoritarianism, village
democracy or orthodox theocracy .[ 8 ] These ideas, based as
earlier argued, in a Russian contempt and feeling of
inferiority towards the West, creates difficulties for the
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building of mutual confidence and cooperation between the
West and the Russians.
All these factors constitute threats to the Gorbachev
regime's reform work, and thereby the freedom of Eastern
Europe. The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the
rapid change of political system in these countries is, in
fact, a humilation to the Soviet Union and a recognition of
a failure of the Soviet communist model. The same is true
about more drastic reforms in the Soviet Union itself.
Learned values and (dogmatic) ideology repeated over the
years in schools, through media and former Soviet leaders,
are gradually explained as invalid or at least partly
invalid. At the same time a flourishing West can be observed
because of greater openness and an Eastern Europe quickly
acknowledging adherence to the Western political system.
Henry Kissinger has argued that the declining appeal of
communist ideology does not eliminate the threat of historic
Russian expansionism. Rather it increases this threat. [9]
These drastic changes, made in a Russian environment,
are very critical in a country which through history has
reacted most aggressively when in a state of weakness .[ 10
]
History has also demonstrated an unpredictability of Soviet
behavior. Every new Soviet leader, remaining in office long
enough, has denounced or strikingly deviated from the
predecessor. As concluded by Seweryn Bialer and Joan
Afferica, the Soviet Union remains the unsatisfied great
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power. [11] This has to be kept in mind when dealing with the
Soviets
.
6.2 The East European Domestic Dimension
Through the whole post-World War II era the
international political situation has been the most
important determinant for the Soviet bloc countries' degree
of self-determination. During times of high political
tension or Soviet perception of its security as threatened,
the bloc countries were intensively watched by the Soviet
leaders, and the room for domestic maneuver was
narrowed. [ 12 ] Therefore, in an era of relaxed tension and a
diminishing importance of ideology, the Soviet Union has
been able to show a gradually increasing pragmatism which
has given Eastern Europe considerable leeway (though so far
unevenly used among the countries for domestic reforms)
.
The initial major problem that the East European
countries would have to face in a political transformation
of the area, is the question of where the limits of Soviet
tolerance are reached. The East Europeans will probably know
as little as the Western countries in the 1990's where and
when the Soviet leaders' sensitive security perceptions get
alarmed. This problem is even more complex due to the fact
that even if the Gorbachev regime would clarify the limits
does not mean that the Eastern European countries are
guaranteed Soviet non-intervention. Reforms in the former
Soviet bloc that lead to political turbulence or a
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misinterpretation by the Gorbachev regime about what
constitutes a satisfaction of Soviet security interests,
could mean the end for the reform minded Soviet regime
and/or a new Soviet intervention, directly or indirectly, in
Eastern Europe. [13]
So far the Gorbachev regime has not even clarified its
own view regarding limits of tolerance. This is not a
surprise because one can assume that the present Soviet
regime do not know itself the precise borders of acceptable
movement in Eastern Europe. Gradually though, the limits
seems to have been increasing with a positive correlation to
the amount and width of the undertaken reforms in some of
the Eastern European countries. What was more or less
unthinkable a year ago is today a reality (the abolition of
the communist party's monopoly of power). This dangerous
game of "walking on new ground" causes considerable
difficulties for the former bloc countries that are eager
for a political reconstruction of their societies. There are
no key answers or ready-made solutions.
Considering the depth of the reforms that have taken
place so far within some of the former bloc countries, it is
argued in this study that some of the Eastern European
countries should pay some attention to the Finnish
experience. With the possible exception of Austria, Finland
is the only country that has experience from building a
pluralistic, democratic society within a Soviet sphere of
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influence. Compared to Austria, the Finnish case has been
much more critical, and the sensitivity of the region has
rapidly increased over the years. This is due to the removal
of some of the geopolitical strategic balance from the
European continent to Northern Europe (the Soviet
construction of huge military bases on the Kola Peninsula,
northeast of Finland). Finland's forty five years of
experience of avoiding Soviet dominance has forced the
country, as shown in the case study, to develop a unique and
highly sophisticated security strategy.
Even though the Finnish case, with its peculiar
characteristics, has taken place in another, more difficult
time era, there are some conclusions which are interesting
for the highly sensitive Eastern European region. Finland,
even though an independent country, has had to adjust its
external and internal politics to satisfy Soviet security
needs. These demands have created a Finnish Realpolitik, the
so called "Neighborhood Politics". The most important part
in this strategy is the "pre-emptive policies" .[ 14 ] These
are policies made in efforts to stabilize Finland and the
surrounding area's security. Finland was close to learning
this lesson the "hard way". After the country got rid of the
major obstacle to being a neutral state (the Soviet return
of Finnish land, earlier used for a Soviet military base)
,
the Finnish President Kekkonen travelled extensively in the
West to propagate this new-won neutrality. This grand
approach towards the West caused alarm in the- Soviet Union,
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and therefore, Finland came under heavy pressure from the
Soviet leaders. From this experience Finland learned that it
had to balance its legitimation of neutrality and the
providing of enough "neighborhood politics". At this time it
was important to Finland to show the West that the country
really was a neutral state.
Those Eastern European states which are now under
reforms towards a future neutral status, need not in the
near future to prove to the West, a strict adherence to
neutrality. Therefore, they do not need to walk the complex
balance path of Finland. But they do need to work for
stability, internally as well as externally, in the region.
"Pre-emptive" policies and "Neighborhood" politics are
therefore essential strategies and should be adopted in
these countries' foreign policies. Secondly, the bloc
countries under political transformation should be extremely
cautious in their methods of reaching neutrality. First
priority must be given to an equivalent of Finland's
"Eastern Policy" (which still is, in fact, more important in
Finland than its neutrality policy)
.
Another important conclusion from the Finnish-Soviet
relations is the importance of personality prior to
ideology. The traditional Russian trust in character or
personality instead of institutions or ideology is still, as
the Finnish case shows, an important aspect in Soviet
foreign relations. The Eastern European countries should
therefore continue to present long-term sitting presidents
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with a character or personality that has, or will be able to
win, Soviet confidence. Because of the Soviets' own
experience, as well as Russian traditions, personality is
seen as a guarantee of continuity and therefore important
for a stable relationship
.[ 15 ] The same would apply to
certain positions in government (as the Finnish "Night Frost
Crisis" show) . As the above argumentation suggests, a
perfectly Western "vibrant" democracy with frequent changes
of personel in important positions, might not be, at least
initially, a model for the former bloc countries. These
nations would need to consider an understanding for
something similar to the Finnish "democratic
authoritarianism" . This would imply a long-term adherance to
foreign policies promoting stable and strategically based
relations with the Soviet Union. The dilemma for the Eastern
European political leaders is the need to work with
accomodation towards the Soviet Union and at the same time
control the great potentialities of antipathy towards the
Soviets among the peoples in Eastern Europe.
6.3 The Western Dimension
The Western countries (including the United States)
have, like most countries in Eastern Europe, a history of
anti—Russian feelings. The establishment of Soviet communism
even increased this tradition of antipathy. The aggressive
form of marxist-leninist ideology and its internationalism,
i.e. spread of communist revolutions, caused great alarm in
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Europe, especially under difficult time periods such as the
great depression of the 1930's.
In the immediate post-World War II period some of the
weak Western European governments were close to panic
because of fear of a domestic Soviet communist coup. This
was especially the case in Italy and France which had strong
established communist parties with close ties to the Soviet
Union. The Soviet "take over" in many Eastern European
countries, and the following turbulent years of the bloc
formation, culminating in the Czechoslovak coup of 1948,
brought United States' committment to the defense of Western
Europe. The Marshall Plan, created by the United States in
order to retrieve economic stability in the region, was seen
as the most efficient way to undercut communism. [ 16
]
Stalin's aggressive foreign policy of "inevitable war",
and ruthless treatment of the Soviet-created puppet states,
followed by a smoother but still - when needed - ruthless
Khrushchev, created a world challenge to the United States
and an immense anti-communist feeling within this nation.
The myth of the "evil empire" was established to create
public commitment to world-wide communist containment. This
policy of containment was seen among the Soviet leaders as
highly offensive and, in turn, strengthened the Soviet
equivalent myths about the West and its needs to increase
the defense. This common misperception between states is
refered to by Robert Jervis as the Spiral Model. [17] This
model claims its base to be the anarchic setting of
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international relations. He explains the Spiral Model in the
following way:
"When states seek the ability to defend themselves, they qettoo much and too little - too much because they gain the
ability to carry out aggression; too little because othersbemg menaced, will increase their own arms and so reducethe first state's security. Unless the requirements for
offense and defense differ in kind or amount, a status quopower will desire a military posture that resembles that of
an aggressor. For this reason others can not infer from itsforces and preparations whether the state is
aggressive. States therefore tend to assume the worst. [18]
Robert Jervis cites as an example the Soviet consolidation
of its hold over Czechoslovakia in 1948. The Soviets,
knowing it harmed Western values, expected a reaction from
the West. But the following formation of NATO and the
explanation given for this move, greatly alarmed the Soviet
leaders. Since the Soviets assumed that the United States
saw the situation as they did, they concluded that the
United States was even more dangerous than they had
thought. [19] Likewise, many Western states did not
understand Soviet security thinking and misperception
repeated itself constantly. It is possible to argue that as
a consequence of some Western policies of blatant anti-
communism, the communist system and the Soviet's hold over
Eastern Europe perpetuated itself. It is known, through
history, that a weak Russia/Soviet Union has even become
more dangerous and aggressive. [20] Western policies,
conducted without a certain knowledge and understanding of
Soviet thinking, have then imposed destabilizing effects on
the development and general situation in the Soviet bloc-
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countries. A general view in the West has been that if
anything would change in Eastern Europe, the West would have
to initiate this move. As argued by David Wedgwood Benn,
"due to the notion of changeless totalitarianism which had
so dominated Western perceptions of Soviet society", the
policies of the Gorbachev regime took many Western experts
by surprise. [21] The knowledge of the Soviet system as such
and its Russian heritage, was seen as not being able to
produce pragmatic results and new thinking. The sudden
change in Soviet policies has again raised the question, as
argued by Jerry Hough, that the West need to better
understand the Soviet mind. [22] This is especially important
in a Soviet period of modernization of what seems to be an
improvement in traditional Russian heavy-handed relations.
Simultaneously, the West needs, in order to continue a
progress in the dialogue with the Soviet Union, to clarify
its own motives and objectives .[ 23 ]
.
During the post-World War II era, the international
political situation has been the denominator for Eastern
Europe's potential freedom, and it is argued in this study
that this will be the case for the forseeable future. The
West needs therefore to provide enough mutual security as
perceived by the Soviet leaders. This implies policies based
on a better understanding of the Soviet Union/Russian
thinking, and a change in traditional Western thinking of
East-West conflict as an unalterable fact of life and
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generaly attributable to the nature of the Soviet
system. [24] Presumably one of the best and easiest ways to
create better understanding between the two political
systems is to start a cautious integration of the Soviet
Union in the world economic system and nation wide issue-
related cooperation.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The Soviet Union is still Russia in the sense of its
special, divorced from Europe, political and social culture.
A s *-r ict communist appearance might gradually be abandoned
but the base of authoritarian Soviet—Russia is still there
which includes the traditional vibrant security needs, and a
potentially unsatisfied nationalism. It is argued in this
study that a marxist-leninist ideology was quite easily
adopted in Russia due to its particular political and social
characteristics. These societal characteristics will if not
stop, at least very much slow down the process to adopt
pluralism and democracy in the near future and in the same
way as Eastern Europe.
The new Soviet leadership and the reform initiatives
demanded in the form of more openness, democratization, and
"new thinking" are, as Seweryn Bialer argues, a sign of the
time we live in.[l] The Gorbachev generation is, like the
contemporary generation in the West, a more educated,
informed, and experienced group from which new leaders are
recruited. Compared to the Brezhnev generation, which
important leaders were more or less handpicked by Stalin and
his closest associates after the great purges, the Gorbachev
generation of leaders have risen to the top through hard
competition. In this sense, the Soviet Union is affected by
demands of our times in the same way as the West, and these
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variables, which are in common for both East and West, will
undoubtedly increase and lessen the impact of nation-
specific cultural and social peculiarities. Therefore, as
interaction between nations continues to increase, it is
nothing more unnatural for our times than a Soviet empire
with old-fashioned imperial ties in Eastern Europe.
The long—lasting Brezhnev regime's preoccupation with
preserving status quo delayed this process of modernization
in thinking. Even though the Soviet leadership under
Gorbachev seems to have rapidly changed some fundamental
thinking and conceptions, we can not expect the Soviet Union
to change, in a similar way and speed, the basic values and
ideas inherited from a long history and deep cultural
influences. Therefore, great differences between the Soviet
Union and its Western neighbors will continue to exist. In a
time of relaxation of tensions, and new opportunities for
cooperation, it is essential for the partners to better
understand each other, and the risks of misunderstandings
when two different political cultures interact. Considering
the unsure position of the Gorbachev regime's leadership
status, the West must take the lead in this process.
The dilemma for Eastern Europe is that the countries
was part of a Russian "peripheral" empire. Therefore,
changes in Eastern Europe towards real independence are
causing repercussions in the Russian "domestic" empire, the
Soviet Union. [2] The reasons for this are that the former
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peripheral" empire as well as the "domestic" empire, have
both been held together (in most cases) by pure military
force. This limits, or at least, seriously complicates the
room for maneuver of the Soviet leadership as well as for
the East Europeans. As Seweryn Bialer points out, what is at
stake is more than Moscow's outer empire. [3]
The Eastern European countries, in their quest for
political transformation, can only help their precarious
situation by doing their best to guarantee Soviet security
in the region. Stability and good relations are essential in
the future Eastern European-Soviet relations. As the Finnish
case shows, the Soviet leaders have shown a surprisingly
high degree of pragmatism - but under the conditions that
enough Soviet security have been provided. The Soviet
leaders' experience from its relations with Finland, as well
as Austria, works to the East Europeans' advantage.
Cooperative and stable relations with the Soviet Union,
and measures to control the potentials of Eastern European
antipathy towards the Soviet Union, are one of the important
steps to secure democracy within the former bloc countries.
Eastern Europe has great possibilities of developing strong
and profitable economic ties with the Soviet Union. The
region has a thorough knowledge of trading with the Soviets
which will be of great value - not only for the East
Europeans but also for the West. The economic ties are
likely to, just like in the Finnish case, secure good
relations with a politically- different Soviet Union.
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To create as little political turmoil as possible the
transformation of Eastern Europe to pluralistic democracies
should, as stressed by both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew
Brzezinski
,
continue with keeping the two military
alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, intact. [4] At the same
time the West European countries should cautiously secure
the East European countries' economic and political
stability through associate these nations with the European
Community as soon as possible. [5]
Future politics and continuing world integration
demands increasingly greater skills in statesmanship and
relations. The next challenge, which hopefully is for the
better to the world, should be the building of an
international security system which is based on something
else than the existence of a permanent common enemy.
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EPILOGUE
The political transformation of Eastern Europe
continues with an astonishing speed. It is now clear that
the Soviet Union can no longer reverse this process in
Eastern Europe. The main reason for this is not the
commitment to new policies and methods taken by the present
Soviet regime but the reason of maintaining good relations
with the West, which is seen by the Soviet leaders as very
important. Even though direct Soviet influence in Eastern
Europe is limited, the Soviet leaders will continue to have
a great indirect influence in the region. The new Eastern
European regimes have been able, so far independently of the
Soviet Union, to decide on radically new policies towards
democracy and economic improvement.
The political situation in the region is very fragile
and unstable. The politically very sensitive "German
question" is in a process of rapid unification of the two
Germanies. The "German question" will remain to be a
question because of the very sensitive issue whether the new
Germany, or its former Western part, will be connected to
the NATO alliance or if the whole Germany has to be neutral.
Germany will therefore continue to be of a great problem for
the Eastern European region's political stability, as well
as the Soviet Union-Western relations. The Eastern European
nations need to work intensively with what in this study has
been called "Neighborhood politics", i.e. region related
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initiatives and cooperation to stabilize the political
situation. This includes good relations and thoughtful
strategies towards the Soviet Union.
At this time (early 1990) the Soviet Union has not much
time to deal with Eastern Europe. The "loss" and let-go of
Soviet Union's "peripheral" empire has brought serious
complications and turmoil in its "domestic" empire. The
former Baltic states, with their identification to the
Eastern European people and the ongoing process, have moved
rapidly towards hopes for independence. Georgia has also
taken steps in this direction and the Soviet leaders can
also expect more problems in their Islamic territories.
The new Soviet regime's first moves in the "New
Thinking" spirit - which started in Eastern Europe - have
accelerated the inevitable process to such an extent that
the whole Soviet Union itself is now already in danger. To
this comes the lack of economic improvement and even
deterioration of the economic situation which is threatening
to make the Soviet Union unmanageable. The increasing social
and political chaos in the Soviet Union is another factor of
danger to the transformation of Eastern Europe. A well
functioning cooperation and stable relations between the
West and the Soviet Union, free from the misperceptions of
the past, are of major importance in this critical
situation.
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